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Abstract—The fifth-generation (5G) mobile networks target
a variety of new use cases that involve a massive amount of
heterogeneous devices connected to the same infrastructure. This
trend also brings new security threats, and one of the most critical
ones for the availability of network services is a Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. A small portion of the billions
of connected devices can be employed as a botnet to trigger
a massive DDoS flooding attack that can bring down important
services or affect the complete infrastructure. Traditional security
systems against DDoS attacks are generally designed to work in
infrastructures with a particular topology. However, the mobility
of many devices subscribed to the network should be taken into
account when designing defence systems. Otherwise, both the
detection and the trace back of the attacker will be limited to
non-mobile devices as the source of the attack. This is specially
relevant when security needs to be part of the definition of the
network slices associated to the 5G networks. This paper presents
a novel approach to overcome the limitation of traditional detec-
tion systems. A novel sensor provides the required information
to trace back an attacker even if it is moving among different
locations. The proposed approach is suitable to be deployed in
almost all 5G network segments including the Edge. Architectural
design is described and empirical experiments have validated the
proposed approach.
Index Terms—5G Network, DDoS Attack, Mobile botnet,
Attacker traceback
I. INTRODUCTION
The next generation of telecommunication networks (5G) is
already hitting the market in 2019 and will continue expanding
worldwide. Many benefits are expected such as speed and
latency improvements, which will increase the number of user
equipment (UE) subscribers. It is predicted to reach 1.5 billion
of 5G subscriptions for enhanced mobile broadband by the
end of 2024 according to Ericsson mobility report [1]. In
fact, 5G is the first mobile technology designed to meet the
unique requirements of connected devices for health, industrial
applications, transportation and many IoT devices. However,
that increase of mobile and non-mobile devices connected to a
5G infrastructure will also increase the potential cyber threats.
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is an important
threat for these networks, and detection and mitigation strate-
gies need to be adapted to protect 5G infrastructures against
them.
DDoS attack detection and mitigation has been an important
topic in the literature. They are considered particularly difficult
to detect or trace back due to their distributed nature [2].
Moreover, many times attackers use fake IP addresses to hide
their identities, which makes it more complicated to trace
back. Furthermore, a critical issue to take into consideration
is the possible mobility of the devices used as a botnet. Any
UE can move around different locations. Thus, the network
topology can change unpredictably, being more complicated to
trace back the origin of an attack and let alone to mitigate it.
Therefore, traditional detection and mitigation systems, which
are not aware of these random changes in topology, will not be
able to protect 5G mobile networks. Trace back mechanisms,
such as packet marking or link testing[3], are not viable in case
of a DDoS attack because of their high computational, network
or management overheads. One crucial objective declared
by the 5G-PPP Architecture Working Group is to create a
cognitive and autonomic network management system that can
self-adapt to the changing conditions of the network, which
includes changes in the topology of the network [4]. To achieve
this goal it is essential to start gathering enough meta-data
to be aware of user mobility. The approach presented in this
paper is based on a cooperative work between a traditional
Intrusion Detection System (IDS), and a novel alert enhancer
that provides needed metadata to allow the trace back of
mobile users.
Fig. 1 shows a brief scheme of the segments of a 5G
architecture. In this figure, there are different UE devices
connected to the 5G network and they can be for instance
mobile phones, cars, ambulances or computers. They are con-
nected to the network through the 5G Radio Access Network
(RAN), which is typically associated with the deployment of
the antennas and Remote Radio Heads (RRHs) or Distributed
Units (DUs) on top of the buildings. The Edge Segment is
typically associated with the last mile of the network, where
machines are allocated to run different needed processes close
to the user and where BaseBand Units (BBUs) or Centralised
Units (CUs) are allocated. In Fig. 1, the Edge and Core
Segments have been represented as a multi-tenant network,
where different virtual operators share the infrastructure. Thus,
two edges have been depicted and in each edge two different
tenants are being served for illustration purposes. In fact,
the two virtual machines in each of the edges belong to
two different virtual network operators. This multi-tenancy
property, where a different operator can share the cost of the
physical infrastructure, is a key characteristic of 5G networks,
and a new challenge to be overcome for defence mechanisms.
In the Core Segment, there are various control plane and
data plane components for mobility and session management,
among others. Finally, network operators are interconnected
Fig. 1. Overview Architecture of a 5G multi-tenant infrastructure.
to each other through the Multi-Domain Segment. A more
detailed description of the 5G architecture can be found at
[5].
There are many discussions about the best location to deploy
a defence system [6] [7]. The three main possible locations
are inside the Edge Segment, inside the Core Segment and
outside the Multi-Domain Segment. In addition, a hybrid
approach of them has been discussed. To allocate it in the
Edge Segment will provide as an advantage a quick detection
and mitigation of the attack from a UE botnet due to the
short distance. Moreover, it avoids affecting the rest of the
infrastructure. However, in case of a massive distributed attack,
there is a lack of aggregated information in such a close point,
and the accuracy of the detection can be affected. Locating
the defence system inside the Core Segment, close to the
victim, has the advantage of having all the needed aggregated
information of all the malicious traffic from the distributed
attack. However, at this point, the detection of the attack can
be late since the attack has already affected the infrastructure.
Deployment in the Multi-Domain Segment is an excellent
point to have extensive knowledge of the source of the attack,
but probably not to know the victim. This work is focused
on a hybrid alternative, where a Network Intrusion Detection
System (NIDS) can be deployed in the Edge, the Core or the
Multi-Domain Segment. This novel NIDS can be deployed
flexibly as mentioned, and more importantly, it is capable of
detecting the attack coming from mobile users and providing
the needed information for proper mitigation in the next step.
A. State of the art
Different works such as [8] and [9] have demonstrated
the ability of mobile botnets to carry out coordinated attacks
against a common victim. Among the current available NIDS
tools, there is no NIDS that supports a complete defence
for mobile edge 5G multi-tenant networks. This is mainly
because that conventional NIDSs are not ready to provide
the needed information to be able to apply fine-grained
countermeasures for attackers acting from mobile users. The
design of novel defence mechanisms within a 5G network
environment should consider the technological advancement
of 5G’s new paradigm. Existing work have contributed to
overcoming some of the different challenges in the traceback
of an DDoS attacker. In [10], OpenFlow switches are used
to present a tracing back anomaly approach. Potential paths
of the attack identified through a graph-based model, but the
exact point of the attack is not provided. In [11], Software
Defined Networking (SDN) traffic is classified using Support
Vector Machines. The features extracted from the traffic for
the classification process are described in this work. However,
none on the features are related to the identification of the
5G user, needed to manage mobility. In case of a DDoS from
mobile UEs, this approach does not allow tracing back the
origin of the attack and consequently proper mitigation is
not possible. In [12], mitigation is proposed through a two
hierarchies of filtering process. A first filter is placed at the
mobile edge computing servers to prevent spoofing attacks
close to the source. A second filter located in cloud servers
classifies the traffic of the complete network. Nevertheless,
tracing back the mobile attacker is not supported.
B. Contributions of this work
The following contributions and innovations towards the
protection of future generation mobile networks are provided
in this work:
• To allow the detection of DDoS attacks towards fine-
grained mitigation when the source of the attack is a UE
Fig. 2. System design.
moving across different locations.
• To allow flexible allocation of the detection system. The
novel NIDS can be deployed in almost all the 5G network
segments including the Edge, the Core and Multi-Domain
Segments.
• To allow the mitigation of the attack at any point of the
malicious flow path, either close to the source of the
attack or close to the victim because of the extended
knowledge of the source of the attack.
• To allow the integration with different conventional
NIDSs because of the plugin-based design of this ap-
proach.
II. SYSTEM DESIGN
In order to overcome the current limitations of traditional
NIDSs for mobile edge 5G infrastructures, a novel approach
is proposed. When a DDoS attack is triggered by a mobile
botnet, the main limitation of traditional NIDSs is the lack of
information to trace back the origin of the attack for proper
mitigation. This approach solves the problem by combining
traditional NIDSs with an advanced classifier to obtain the
missing needed information. This approach leads to the first
step towards a complete self-managed defence of mobile net-
work infrastructures due to the extended information provided
within the detection of the attack.
A. Architecture overview
The proposed system can be deployed in three different
locations of a 5G infrastructure. Specifically, in the Edge
Segment (Fig. 1 [B]), the Core Segment (Fig. 1 [C]), or the
Multi-Domain Segment (Fig. 1 [D]). Fig. 2 shows how the
traffic coming from the data network is mirrored to a service
node of the management network. In this service node, the
traditional NIDS is deployed, and its alerts are then extended
by our novel component, which reports a new alert with the
extended metadata aware of mobility. This novel component
is referred to as Alert Enhancer (AE). Fig. 2 depicts the
architectural elements of this new AE component:
• Alert Parser: This module consumes the traditional
NIDS alerts. It has a plugin-based design, and thus the
AE is extensible to any alert format coming from any
traditional NIDS. The current implemented version in this
work supports Unified2 [13] format, a widespread format
used by many traditional NIDS such as Snort, Suricata
and Bro, as well as some alert managing software such
as Barnyard and Pigsty. It is a binary format that allows
fast processing and minimises packet loss. However, any
other alert format could be processed by the AE if the
plugin with the parser is added.
• Flow Classifier: This module extracts the needed meta-
data from the malicious flow. The complete packet with
the flow headers is included in the Unified2 alert previ-
ously parsed by the Alert Parser. The role of the flow
classifier is to extract the values stored in network byte
order and classify them through Deep Packet Inspection
(DPI). The definition of different patterns has been added
to this module, so different network protocols at any level
of the OSI model can be matched. Current NIDSs only
provides information regarding the outer header, while
the minimum information needed for a proper traceback
of the attacker in a multi-tenant mobile infrastructure is
the Unique Virtual ID that identifies a Virtual Operator
(VNI) and the Tunnel Endpoint Identification (TEID) that
identifies the UE. Those two values, included in inner
headers, are extracted by the flow classifier. A more
detailed list of the extended information extracted by the
classifier is depicted in the next section.
• Alert Reporter: This module reports the enhanced alert
including the information of the alert provided by the
traditional NIDS (such as type of attack, alert time,
and priority) and the metadata extracted by the flow
classifier to allow the traceback of the source of the
attack and thus a fine-grained mitigation. This enhanced
alert is sent through the management interface to the
Management Node through a RabbitMQ message bus.
With this information the Management Node, would be
able to take decisions of how and where to mitigate the
attack (out of the scope of this work).
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This research is focused on attacks launched by botnets
formed by a high volume of mobile devices sending malicious
traffic against the network. To assure the scalability of the
proposed solution, several scalability tests have been run. The
solution has been prototyped and validated in a real scenario
for the use case of a large-scale DDoS UDP flooding attack
within a 5G multi-tenant network. A UDP flooding attack is
a DDoS attack that floods a target with UDP packets [2].
The primary purpose of this attack is to overwhelm random
ports on the targeted host. Due to the unknown application
associated with the received datagram, the victim sends back
an ICMP Destination Unreachable packet per UDP packet re-
ceived. Thus, the victim resources become overwhelmed for a
significant amount of UDP packets received, and consequently,
its services become unavailable. The attack has been emulated
running Bonesi [14] in each UE. This tool has been configured
to send traffic from one IP address per UE. The experiments
Fig. 3. Example of an experiment scenario in CORE emulator
generate UDP flooding traffic of 25 Mbps and 50 Mbps from
each UE, which is a realistic scenario considering today’s
speed in the UE subscriptions. The Common Open Research
Emulator (CORE) [15] has been employed to validate the
solution in terms of scalability. Developed by Boeing Research
and Technology and US Navy Research Laboratory, CORE is
a proven large-scale container-based deployment tool with a
realistic emulator of network conditions. The CORE provides
an Infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) stack, which makes use
of Linux network namespaces as the hypervisor to allow the
creation of a set of lightweight virtual machines that acts
as a real node, creating a complete functional infrastructure.
Different scenarios such as the one shown in Fig. 3 have been
generated and executed, to test the scalability and flexibility
of the proposed solution. In the scenario of Fig. 3 64 UE
devices are represented as mobile phones and connected
to several antennas (RRH), and they represent botnets that
will trigger the attack. The Edge Segment is represented by
different Infrastructure Providers (IAAS, eg. EDGE-IAAS-2)
and Virtual Operators ( eg. EDGE-5GDSP-2-CU-1), similarly
with the Core Segment. In this case, our solution is deployed
in the Core Segment, where the traffic is mirrored and received
by the Service Node. The management node depicted in this
scenario is out of the scope of the presented work and thus
not considered for the experiments. The attack triggered by
the botnets target to the victim node tagged as VICTIM in
Fig. 3. The experiments have measured the detection time
of the attack for different CORE scenarios that follow the
same scheme of the one in Fig. 3 but changing the number
of UE devices that compose the botnet. The detection time is
measured from the starting time of the malicious flow to the
time when the enhanced alert is reported. Two different sets
of experiments have been run using two different traditional
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Fig. 4. Detection times of attack of 25 Mb and 50 Mb launched from a botnet
composed by different number of UE devices
NIDSs, Snort and Suricata. Fig. 4 shows the results for the
two sets of experiments, ranging the size of the botnet from
2 to 512 UE devices. Each experiment has been repeated
for the two different attack bandwidths, 25 Mb and 50 Mb
respectively.
In terms of the traditional NIDS used it can be concluded
that both have a very similar behaviour not affecting the overall
performance. Furthermore, the results show a detection time of
less than 16 milliseconds for the worst scenario, a botnet with
512 UE devices and a 50Mb attack bandwidth. The overhead
added by the Alert Enhancer is showed as a percentage of
the total time, being 32% for the larger botnet, equivalent
to 6 milliseconds of the total detection time, which is an
acceptable overhead for a detection system taking into account
the benefits of the improved accuracy for a future efficient
mitigation system. A very important aspect to highlight from
the results is that the behaviour of the system is similar
TABLE I
METADATA INCLUDED IN ALERTS
Feature Traditional NIDS Alert Enhancer
sensor id 3 3*
event id 3 3*
event second 3 3*
event microsecond 3 3*
signature id 3 3*
generator id 3 3*
signature revision 3 3*
classification id 3 3*
priority id 3 3*
Outer Source IP 3 3
Outer Destination IP 3 3
Outer Source port 3 3
Outer Destination port 3 3
protocol 3 3
impact flag 3 3*
impact 3 3*
blocked 3 3*
flowId 7 3
parentFlowId 7 3
Outer MAC Src 7 3
Outer MAC Dst 7 3
Inner MAC Src 7 3
Inner MAC Dst 7 3
l3Proto 7 3
Inner Source IP 7 3
Inner Destination IP 7 3
l4Proto 7 3
flowLabel 7 3
Inner Source Port 7 3
l7Proto 7 3
l7Key1-5 7 3
encapsulationLayer (e.g. 0,1,2) 7 3
encapsulationId (e.g. VNID, TEID) 7 3
encapsulationType1-5 (e.g. vxlan, gtp) 7 3
packetStructure 7 3
completePacketStructure 7 3
firstPacketSeen 7 3
* means that this feature is inherited from the Traditional NIDS.
regardless the number of UE devices in the botnet and the
bandwidth of the attack.
Beyond the detection times, a very important validated con-
tribution is the advanced information provided in the enhanced
alert that assures a crucial improvement in the accuracy of
the mitigation of the attack. Table I details a comparison of
the features provided by both the traditional NIDSs and the
proposed Alert Enhancer. The key features for an accurate
mitigation at any point of the network are highlighted in
bold. Most of them are provided only by the Alert Enhancer,
especially those related to the inner layers of the packet, crucial
information for the traceback of the attacker.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a novel approach is proposed to achieve
advanced trace back of the source of a DDoS attack with a
mobile botnet. The implementation of the proposed solution
uses a realistic 5G infrastructure, overcoming the current
limitations of the traditional NIDSs. This approach is the first
step towards proper mitigation of DDoS attacks with mobile
UEs employed as attackers. The proposed approach has been
empirically tested in a real 5G infrastructure and validated to
fill the gaps of the state of the art without adding significant
overheads. The overhead added to the detection time of two
traditional NIDSs tested is less than 6 milliseconds for an
attack triggered by a botnet of 512 mobile UEs with each UE
sending a 50Mb flooding attack. The architecture presented is
modular and plugin-based, which allows the user to integrate
it easily with any other NIDS not explicitly considered in this
work.
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